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Abstract
We show that the proportional response algorithm for computing an
economic equilibrium in a Fisher market model can be interpreted as it-
eratively approximating the economy by one with Cobb-Douglas utilities,
for which a closed-form equilibrium can be obtained. We also extend the
method to allow elasticities of substitution at most one.
1 Introduction
In [3] Zhang proposed the proportional response distributed algorithm to
compute an economic equilibrium for a Fisher model where each consumer
has a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function, viewing
it as a method in which agents iteratively reﬁne their bids for the goods.
Birnbaum, Devanur, and Xiao [1] consider the algorithm in the case of
linear utilities, extend it to allow spending constraint utilities, and in-
terpret it as a generalized gradient-descent or generalized proximal-point
method for an associated optimization problem. Both papers also analyze
the convergence of the method.
In this note, we show that the algorithm can be viewed as iteratively
approximating the economy by economies with Cobb-Douglas utilities,
for which the equilibrium can be obtained in closed form, and extend it
to allow elasticity coeﬃcients of one or less. From this point of view,
the method appears as a variant of Newton’s method, in which usually
successive linearizations are made.
2 CES utility functions
Suppose there are 푛 goods. A CES utility function assigns to a bundle of
goods 푥 ∈ ℜ푛+ the utility
푢(푥) =
(∑
푗
푎
1/휎
푗 푥
1−1/휎
푗
)휎/(휎−1)
. (1)
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Here 푎 is a nonzero vector in ℜ푛+ representing the relative desirability of
the goods, and 휎 > 0, 휎 ∕= 1, is the elasticity coeﬃcient. (For the analysis
below, we assume that all components 푎푗 are positive, but the general case
can be obtained by summing over just those 푗 for which 푎푗 is positive.)
We say the utility function represents an agent’s preferences if in making
economic decisions she acts as if she were maximizing this function. Hence
any strictly monotonic transformation of a utility function also represents
the agent’s preferences. We can therefore assume without loss of generality
that ∑
푗
푎푗 = 1.
We can also write 휌 for 1− 1/휎 to get
푢(푥) =
(∑
푗
푎1−휌푗 푥
휌
푗
)1/휌
, (2)
where −∞ < 휌 < 1, 휌 ∕= 0. For 휌 positive, an equivalent utility function
is
푢(푥) =
∑
푗
푎1−휌푗 푥
휌
푗 , (3)
and if we write 푤푗 for 푎
1/(휎−1)
푗 we obtain
푢¯(푥) =
∑
(푤푗푥푗)
휌. (4)
This is the form that Zhang [3] assumes. If 휌 = 1, corresponding to
휎 →∞, we get the linear utility function ∑푗 푤푗푥푗 .
Let us take the (natural) logarithm of 푢(푥) in (2) above:
ln푢(푥) =
ln
(∑
푗 푎
1−휌
푗 푥
휌
푗
)
휌
.
We can now use L’Hoˆpital’s rule to take limits as 휌→ 0, obtaining
ln푢0(푥) =
∑
푗 푎푗 ln(푥푗/푎푗)∑
푗 푎푗
=
∑
푗
푎푗 ln푥푗 −
∑
푗
푎푗 ln 푎푗 .
The constant part can be eliminated, and we obtain the limiting utility
function
ln푢0(푥) =
∑
푗
푎푗 ln푥푗 , or 푢
0(푥) =
∏
푗
푥
푎푗
푗 , (5)
which is a CES utility function with elasticity coeﬃcient 1, and is called
a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
3 Economies and equilibria
Suppose now we have 푚 agents, each with a CES utility function 푢푖 given
as above by a vector 푎푖 = (푎푖푗) ∈ ℜ푛+ and 휌푖, and a budget 푏푖 > 0.
We assume without loss of generality that there is one unit of each good
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available, that
∑
푖 푏푖 = 1, and that
∑
푖 푎푖 > 0, so that each good is desired
by some agent.
We say a price vector 푝¯ ∈ ℜ푛+ and allocations 푥¯푖 = (푥¯푖푗) ∈ ℜ푛+, 푖 =
1, . . . ,푚, form an equilibrium if
(a) the market clears:
∑
푖 푥¯푖 = 푒 := (1; 1; . . . ; 1); and
(b) each agent maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraint:
푥¯푖 solves
max
푥푖
{푢푖(푥푖) : 푝푇푥푖 ≤ 푏푖, 푥푖 ∈ ℜ푛+}.
Since each 푎푖 has a positive component, 푝
푇 푥¯푖 = 푏푖, and so we have the
normalization 푝푇 푒 = 푝푇
∑
푖 푥¯푖 =
∑
푖 푏푖 = 1.
Observe that the optimality conditions for agent 푖’s utility maximiza-
tion problem involve her utility function only through ∇푢푖(푥¯푖), and so this
is the critical part of her preferences as far as equilibrium is concerned.
Now suppose that each agent has a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
which we write for convenience in its logarithmic form:
푢푖(푥푖) =
∑
푗
푎푖푗 ln푥푖푗 . (6)
This is a concave function of 푥푖. Suppose for a moment that all 푎푖푗 ’s are
positive. Then from the (necessary and suﬃcient) optimality conditions,
agent 푖’s utility maximization problem at prices 푝 is solved by 푥¯푖 with
푎푖푗/푥¯푖푗 = 휆푖푝푗 for all 푗, where 휆푖 ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with her budget constraint. Hence 휆푖 is positive (and all components
of 푝 must be positive) and 푥¯푖푗 = 푎푖푗/(휆푖푝푗), and then from the budget
constraint, 휆푖 = 1/푏푖 and so 푥¯푖푗 = 푏푖푎푖푗/푝푗 . Thus agent 푖 spends a
constant fraction 푎푖푗 of her budget on good 푗 whatever its price is. It is
easy to check that this remains true if some 푎푖푗 ’s are zero (and then the
corresponding prices 푝푗 can also be zero). To obtain an equilibrium, we
require
∑
푖 푥¯푖푗 = 1 for each 푗, and this gives 푝푗 =
∑
푖 푏푖푎푖푗 . Hence we ﬁnd
that 푝¯ = (푝¯푗 :=
∑
푖 푏푖푎푖푗), 푥¯푖 = (푥¯푖푗 := 푏푖푎푖푗/푝¯푗), 푖 = 1, . . . ,푚, give an
equilibrium.
4 The proportional response algorithm
This method proceeds as follows (assuming for now that all 휌푖’s are pos-
itive, as does Zhang). At each stage, the agents make bids 푏푖푗 for each
good, where 푏푖푗 is positive if 푎푖푗 is and
∑
푗 푏푖푗 = 푏푖. These bids then de-
termine the prices 푝 via 푝푗 =
∑
푏푖푗 , and the corresponding allocations are
푥푖 = (푥푖푗), 푖 = 1, . . . ,푚, where 푥푖푗 = 푏푖푗/푝푗 . Agent 푖 obtains the utility
(in the form (3))
푢푖(푥푖) =
∑
푗
푎1−휌푖푖푗 푥
휌푖
푖푗 =:
∑
푗
푢푖푗(푥푖푗).
(An analogous analysis, with the same result, goes through if the utilities
are written in the form (4).) At the next stage, the agents make bids
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proportional to the fraction of utility they obtained from each good in the
previous round:
푏+푖푗 :=
푢푖푗(푥푖푗)
푢푖(푥푖)
푏푖.
We now show how this algorithm can be interpreted as successive
approximation by Cobb-Douglas economies. Indeed, suppose at some
stage the agents are considering allocations 푥푖 = (푥푖푗), 푖 = 1, . . . ,푚. The
components of the gradient of 푢푖 at 푥푖 are then
∂푢푖(푥푖)
∂푥푖푗
= 휌푖푎
1−휌푖
푖푗 푥
휌푖−1
푖푗 , (7)
while those of the Cobb-Douglas utility function 푢ˆ푖(푥푖) :=
∑
푗 푎ˆ푖푗 ln푥푖푗
are
∂푢ˆ푖(푥푖)
∂푥푖푗
= 푎ˆ푖푗/푥푖푗 .
These two gradients will be proportional to each other if we set
푎ˆ푖푗 :=
푎1−휌푖푖푗 푥
휌푖
푖푗∑
푘 푎
1−휌푖
푖푘 푥
휌푖
푖푘
(the normalization is added so that
∑
푗 푎ˆ푖푗 = 1). We now consider the
economy where each agent’s utility function 푢푖 is replaced by the approx-
imating utility function 푢ˆ푖 with the 푎ˆ푖푗 ’s as above. By the results of the
previous section, the equilibrium in this approximating economy is easy
to write down: agent 푖 spends an amount
푏ˆ푖푗 := 푏푖푎ˆ푖푗
on good 푗 and the resulting equilibrium price vector is 푝ˆ = (푝ˆ푗 =
∑
푖 푏ˆ푖푗).
But by substituting the expression for 푎ˆ푖푗 in that for 푏ˆ푖푗 , we ﬁnd that the
latter agrees with 푏+푖푗 in the proportional response algorithm. And then
so does the next price vector and the corresponding allocations.
We can extend the algorithm to the case that some agents’ elasticity
coeﬃcients are one or less, or some 휌푖’s are zero or less. First suppose
that some 휌푖 is negative. Then 푢푖 in the form (3) is not a monotonic
transformation of 푢푖 in the form (2). Instead, we can use the monotonic
transformation
푢푖(푥푖) =
∑
푗
(−푎1−휌푖푖푗 푥휌푖푖푗 ) =:
∑
푗
푢푖푗(푥푖푗). (8)
We can then, exactly as above, deﬁne the new bids by
푏+푖푗 :=
푢푖푗(푥푖푗)
푢푖(푥푖)
푏푖 =
−푢푖푗(푥푖푗)
−푢푖(푥푖) 푏푖.
We have included the second expression because it may be more natural
to think of the agent’s bid for good 푗 as the fraction of the total (positive)
disutility attributable to the 푗th good times her budget 푏푖, rather than
as a ratio of negative utilities times her budget. If we now take the
gradient of the utility function above, we ﬁnd that its 푗th component
is ∣휌푖∣푎1−휌푖푖푗 푥휌푖−1푖푗 in contrast to (7). Proceeding exactly as above, we ﬁnd
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푎ˆ푖푗 is as before, and so the amounts spent on each good at equilibrium in
the approximating economy are again 푏ˆ푖푗 , and these still agree with the
new bids 푏+푖푗 .
Finally, suppose some agent 푖 has a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Of
course, this needs no approximating by a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
and so we would have 푏ˆ푖푗 = 푎푖푗푏푖. To make this agree with the propor-
tional response algorithm, we need 푎푖푗 to be the proportion of total utility
attributed to the 푗th good. This is true for neither the logarithmic nor the
product form of the utility function (see (5)). It is true for the “function”∑
푗 푎푖푗 , which is the limit as 휌 → 0 of the form (3), but since this is a
constant, it does not represent the agent’s preferences. The only way to
salvage the algorithm is to just deﬁne
푏+푖푗 = 푎푖푗푏푖
for agents 푖 with Cobb-Douglas utility functions.
With these modiﬁcations, we have proved
Theorem 1 The proportional response algorithm for agents with CES
utility functions generates exactly the same bids, price vectors, and allo-
cations as the algorithm that at each iteration approximates the agents’
utility functions as above by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and moves to
the equilibrium of the resulting approximating equilibrium.
The discussion preceding the theorem highlights a diﬃculty with the
proportional response algorithm: it depends crucially on the particular
form taken for the agents’ utility functions, whereas several other forms
are also perfectly adequate representations of their preferences.
As a ﬁnal observation, we note that approximating a nonlinear problem
for which an analytical solution cannot be obtained by a simpler problem
for which it can is exactly the principle behind Newton’s method. In
Newton’s method for ﬁnding a zero of a function, a linear approximation
is made; in Newton’s method for minimizing a function, a quadratic ap-
proximation is used. In the pure exchange economy, approximating utility
functions by Cobb-Douglas utility functions seems natural because the re-
sulting simpler problems can be solved explicitly. This general philosophy
of Newton-like methods and its application to computing economic equi-
libria were described in [2]. Since we are approximating the objective
function of an optimization problem (the utility maximization problem)
by a function whose gradient agrees with the nominal function but whose
Hessian matrix may be much diﬀerent, we cannot expect faster than linear
or even sublinear convergence, and this is what Zhang [3] and Birnbaum,
Devanur, and Xiao [1] obtain.
References
[1] B. Birnbaum, N. Devanur, and L. Xiao, New convex pro-
grams and distributed algorithms for Fisher markets with lin-
ear and spending constraint utilities, manuscript, available at
http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/nikdev/, 2010.
5
[2] M. Todd, Reformulation of economic equilibrium problems for solution
by quasi-Newton and simplicial algorithms, in: The Computation and
Modelling of Economic Equilibria, pp. 19–37, A. Talman and G. van
der Laan, eds,˙ North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1987.
[3] L. Zhang, Proportional response dynamics in the Fisher market, in
ICALP ’09, Proceedings of the 36th International Colloquium on Au-
tomata, Languages, and Programming, pp. 583–594, Springer, Berlin,
2009.
6
